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COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN THE LAW*
by The Hon. Ellen A. Peters**
I speak to you this morning, as Chief Justice of the Connecticut
Supreme Court, from the vantage point of a generalist, a utility infielder, and part-time politician. It seems to me that the study of the
law is a life-long challenge because of the never-ending opportunity to
reflect upon novel questions or upon new versions of old questions. Why
does this opportunity never end? Why are there so many unresolved
issues in the law? Why can't the judges get it straight, once and for
all? In short, why can't the legal system, whatever its other failings, at
least deliver on the promise of certainty that the general public takes to
be a hallmark of the law?
Those of you who do not suffer from amnesia will remember how
your first days in law school were bedeviled by uncertainty. It was not
just an encounter with unfamiliar nomenclature and obscure proce* Adapted from the text of an address delivered to the graduating class or the University of
Connecticut School of Law at Commencement, May 17, 1986.
** Chief Justice, Connecticut Supreme Court. L.L.B., Yale Law School, 1954. Formerly,

Southmayd Professor, Yale Law School.
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dural hang-ups. Those obstacles were minor roadblocks. More unsettling was the fact that burgeoning familiarity with methods of legal
analysis did not suffice to eradicate uncertainty. One of the early adjustments that all of you had to make-for sanity, if not for survival, in
your professional careers-was consciously and stoically to abandon all
hope for discovering neat, precise, ineluctable verities. You learned that
there are no dispositive or definitive principles; in the well-known words
of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, there is no "brooding omnipresence
in the sky."' At best, in law school, there are questions that help to
frame the issues, to define the context and to identify the role that
various participants may usefully play in the process of facilitating the
just resolution of disputes.
I come to you as a bearer of bad news. Graduation from law
school and admission to the bar will not protect you from further disconcerting encounters with uncertainty. It would be comforting indeed
if legislatures could enact and judges could craft specific rules of law
for the definitive resolution of legal controversy. It is not to be; uncertainty is endemic in the law and always will be. The pervasiveness of
uncertainty in the law is not merely the fabrication of esoteric academic minds but is crucial to our understanding of what law can or
cannot do.
There are no doubt countless factors that contribute to uncertainty
in the law, such as the vagaries of factfinding, the ambiguity of statutory language, and the obscurity of directions from the United States
Supreme Court that come to us in the form of opinions divided four,
three and two. This morning, however, I want to focus on just three
factors that make for uncertainty in the law.
First, courts must respond to changes in our scientific environment, to new discoveries about causation in fact, to new risks associated with new developments. Litigation about asbestosis and about diseases caused by Agent Orange, about cancer associated with DES and
about the risks of nuclear waste-all these are examples of areas in
which litigation simply did not exist fifteen years ago.
Second, courts must respond to changes in our economic and political environment, to changes in our patterns of economic organization
and to the resultant changes in governing legislation. Of these factors,
new legislation is the most immediately and most conspicuously destabilizing. Every change in the tax code, or in the criminal code, has
1. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1916).

19861

COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY

IN THE LAW

profound implications for existing case law and statutes because legislative intent can never anticipate the infinite variety of disputes that
may arise. When the legislature, for example, modifies some historical
aspects of the law of rape, or of kidnapping, that legislation inevitably
raises questions about the continued viability of related crimes that
were not redefined
and about related evidentiary rules that were not
2
reconsidered.
Third, courts must respond to changes in our moral environment,
to greater sensitivity to the rights of minorities and women and children and the aged and the handicapped and students and teachers-the
list, thank goodness, keeps growing. Litigation about discrimination,
about unfair treatment in the workplace and in the community, engages every court in the country. That litigation increasingly turns to
state law, and state constitutions, as federal courts retreat from the
commitments of the Warren Supreme Court.3 As attorneys in our state
have been known to lament, invocation of state constitutional rights of
unknown etiology and indefinite scope adds another layer of uncertainty to constitutional adjudication.
The effect of changes in our technological, political and moral climate is to bring to courts cases for which there are no binding precedents. Many of these are cases in which the judiciary is being asked to
respond to questions that are systemically different from the judicial
experience of the past. Courts are familiar with their role of trying to
reconstruct what happened yesterday: who caused that automobile accident; what were the terms of that contract; was that transaction taxable? The new jurisprudence is of a different order entiEely because it
involves courts in planning for the future. Despite their imperfect access to an unclouded crystal ball, courts are involved in devising remedies for discriminatory inequality in school systems, for inadequate
treatment in mental hospitals, for unsafe housing for the dispossessed,
and for unsatisfactory custodial arrangements for children caught up in
family instability.
There are numbers of ways in which attorneys and courts respond
to pervasive uncertainty. By far the poorest is to pretend that the world
2. See, e.g., State v. Jenkins, 198 Conn. 671, 504 A.2d 1053 (1986) (a more recently-cnacted
sentencing provision permitted a lesser penalty for a more serious degree of offense, but until the

legislature takes corrective action, the most recent statute controls in order to avoid a constitutional confrontation).
3.

See. e.g., State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 219, 496 A.2d 498 (1985) (holding that article first.

section 7 of the Connecticut Constitution affords more substantive protection to citizens than does
the fourth amendment of the federal Constitution in the determination of probable cause).
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has not changed and to take refuge in linguistically plausible analogies
that give the appearance of a safe harbor. As advocates, I urge you not
to deceive yourselves; just about any case is distinguishable, just about
any statute is ambiguous. Illusory analogies do not serve to focus the
mind on where the action is. For courts, the discipline of appellate
judging, which requires the writing of articulate and reasoned judicial
opinions, automatically provides a powerful corrective to simplistic reasoning. Among judges, it is well known that sometimes, quite dramatically, "the opinion just won't write."
Another response, with which I have a great deal more sympathy
now than I did as a new judge eight years ago, is to temporize. Every
judge is acutely aware of how far removed courtroom proceedings are
from absolute truth. There may well be other participants in the process of dispute resolution, such as legislators and lay jurors, and, even
more importantly today, administrative agencies or arbitrators. The
best role for a court to adopt may be to insist on procedural regularity
to assure the litigants a fair and timely opportunity for a reasonable
hearing before an impartial tribunal, but otherwise to defer to these
alternate decision-makers.
I do not mean to suggest that deference is always uncontroversial.
The City of Middletown was understandably upset, a few years ago,
when the court upheld state regulators who had permitted the Hartford
Electric Light Company's plant in that community to burn contaminated mineral oil containing PCBs.4 The State Health Department was
recently disappointed, I am sure, by the court's unreadiness to permit a
departmental reorganization to modify an anti-discrimination order of
the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities."
Nor is insistence on procedural regularity always uncontroversial.
Procedural regularity may require the state to assume the cost of providing attorneys for those accused of non-support,6 or of having fathered a child out of wedlock.7 Due process may require a court to
suppress grand jury transcripts while grand jury proceedings are in4. City of Middletown v. Hartford Elec. Light Co., 192 Conn. 591, 473 A.2d 787 (1984)
(plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge proposed burning of oil containing PCBs; as to several
other counts, plaintiffs failed to sufficiently prove facts to sustain their cause of action).

5. Department of Health Serv. v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ex rel.
Mason, 198 Conn. 479, 503 A.2d 1151 (1986) (in contempt proceeding, trial court is not author-

ized to modify remedial order resulting from administrative finding that alleged contemnor engaged in discriminatory conduct).
6. See Lake v. Speziale, 580 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Conn. 1984).
7. Lavertue v. Niman, 196 Conn. 403, 493 A.2d 213 (1985).
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complete.8 This winter, the court made itself unpopular with the media
when it required the Freedom of Information Commission to abide by
its own statutory time limits for the disposition of its own cases. Procedural regularity usually takes time, often costs money, but always is
essential.
There are other prudential devices that courts can invoke to permit
time for further developments to illuminate and perhaps to defuse controversy, and thus to minimize the costs of uncertainty. The late Alexander Bickel, a distinguished member of the Yale Law School faculty,
wrote eloquently of the passive virtues, of the desirability, sometimes,
of making haste slowly, particularly in areas of the law where there is a
perceived need to build community consensus.10 In implementing state
constitutional rights to public education, state courts have engaged in
spirited criticism of present institutional and statutory failings but have
coupled their criticism with self-restraint by way of remedies, so as to
create an opportunity for legislative reentry into principled political decision-making.'1 In our late-lamented case involving the Freedom of Information Commission, there was a second issue concerning the extent
to which municipal agencies could rely on the attorney-client privilege
to justify meeting in executive session 12 At stake was statutory language that was both controlling and obscure. By not deciding that issue, the court created an opportunity for members of the legislature
again to take the laboring oar and to clarify the underlying policy
choice that was theirs to make.13
8. In re Final Grand Jury Report Concerning the Torrington Police Department. 197 Conn.
698, 501 A.2d 377 (1985).
9. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of N. Haven v. Freedom of Information Comm'n, 198 Conn. 498.

503 A.2d 1161 (1986) (holding that the statutory time limits are mandatory). On May 30, 1986.
the Connecticut legislature enacted Public Act No. 86-408, § 2(a), conditionally vlidating actions

of the FOIC in regard to pending cases not heard in conformity with statutory time liniit.
10. A. BICKEL. THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, 111-98 (1962); see also Kronman. Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94

YALE

LJ. 1567 (1985).

11. See Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); id. at 195 Conn. 24. 486
A.2d 1099 (1985) (after holding that existing statutory financing of public education was uncon-

stitutional, the trial court was correct in retaining jurisdiction while the General Assembly was
offered an opportunity to take legislative action).

12.

198 Conn. at 501, 503 A.2d at 1163 (because the statutory time requirements were held to

be mandatory, the court did not reach the issue of whether oral communications between the
Z.B.A. and its attorney were privileged so as to justify an executive session).

13. On May 30, 1986, the Connecticut legislature enacted Public Act No. 86-226. It added
the following section to CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-21g: "(b) An executive session may not be convened
to receive or discuss oral communications that would otherwise be privileged by the attorney-client
relationship if the agency were a nongovernmental entity, unless the executive session is for a

purpose explicitly permitted pursuant to subsection (e) of Section 1-18a." 1986 Conn. Legis. Serv.
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Another prudential virtue has its origin in the teachings of legal
realism. Widespread recognition of the significance of the particular
fact patterns in which controversies emerge has made courts exquisitely
sensitive to the dangers of over-generalization. Tip-toeing through the
minefields of the unknown, courts have learned to take refuge in holdings expressly limited, in a recurrent phrase, "to the circumstances of
this case." In the contemporary writings of American courts, no single
phrase occurs more regularly than this one.
Not all litigation, however, permits deference or allows invocation
of the passive virtues. In the face of uncertainty, courts must resolve
some questions, regrettably, because courts are not the best, but the
only available decision-makers. Courts are acutely aware that many
questions on their new agenda involve matters on which they have no
special expertise. Adjudications about the future needs and conduct of
the mentally ill, and of children, depend upon psychological judgments
that the'best-trained psychiatrists say that they are unable to make.
None of us can say with confidence whether cloning and modifying
genes is so perilous to the public health and welfare that courts should
enjoin such research. When litigants have exhausted other channels,
however, when the political process is unresponsive, and when other institutions in society have, in effect, thrown in the sponge, it is courts
that must respond to our society's self-fulfilling prophecy that for every
problem, there ought to be a law.
Some of the most agonizing cases in this category are also the
most dramatic examples of the interaction of the three vector forces of
science, politics, and morality. I refer to the profoundly troubling disputes about termination of medical care for apparently critically ill
children, accident victims, and old people. These cases come to courts
with a new scientific overlay because modern medicine can, I am told,
keep almost all of us alive, in a manner of speaking, almost indefinitely.
They come to courts with the political overlay of statutes that make the
termination of life the crime of murder or manslaughter or suicide, and
that authorize so-called living wills in only the most restricted of circumstances. They come to courts with the moral overlay of a conflict in
rights that are basic to all of our other hard-won freedoms. On the one
hand there is the right to live, a right whose importance is underscored
both by the Holocaust and by the Hippocratic oath. On the other hand,
there is the right to privacy and to liberiy-the right to exercise per334 (West).
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sonal control over the quality of the lives we and our loved ones live.
These cases come to courts at a time when some courts and commentators are skeptical about the responsiveness of the professional caretakers in the medical profession, to whom courts would like to be able to
defer. Sensitive to the threat of tort liability and even of criminal prosecution, those responsible for the management of medical care understandably may limit their own exposure to risk by supporting the continuation of treatment for patients despite the considerable psychic and
financial costs that such medical decisions may entail.
When cases like this come to courts, as they increasingly and regrettably do, courts cannot avoid playing an active role. Let me put to
you a case about which I only recently read. A young man in Texas, an
Air Force veteran, was injured as a result of a gas leak explosion in
which he was blinded, lost the ends of each of his fingers, and, worst of
all, was seared with third-degree burns over two-thirds of his body. He
was hospitalized for more than a year, during which time he underwent
skin grafts, removal of his left eye, unsuccessful repair of ligament
damage to his left arm, and amputation of parts of fingers of both
hands. His medical care included months of daily immersions in an
acidic solution to sterilize his burns, an excruciatingly painful treatment essential to sustaining his life. He repeatedly asked to be permitted to die, and sought legal assistance to pursue his claim in court. His
caretakers responded by asking that he be ruled incompetent. The preliminary indications were that the court would neither declare him incompetent nor order the withholding of treatment. He withdrew the
case because the very fact of having initiated litigation'led to a more
caring treatment of his wounds. 14
There is an unusual follow-up to this case. Blind, disfigured, and
largely dependent on others to meet his daily needs, the young man
twice unsuccessfully attempted suicide. Then his life took a different
turn, however. He returned to school to become . . . a lawyer. Although he now describes himself as leading a rewarding and meaningful life, he is still convinced that he should have had the right to end
his life immediately after the accident.
We have not yet had such a case in Connecticut but it is bound to
come. A New Jersey court has just decided that for a person who is
overwhelmingly incapacitated, not only so-called heroic measures but
14. The young man's experiences are recounted in R. BuRT. TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS
(1979).
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even life-support systems can be discontinued at family request.15 In
searching to balance the most difficult of human objectives, courts will
need expert advice from independent medical caretakers, from sensitive
psychological consultants, from specially appointed guardians for the
patient, from friends, and from family. Courts will act-must
act-because the case is there. Courts would be the first to acknowledge, however, that judicial intervention in these cases is far from an
ideal solution.
Leaving aside its economic costs, litigation takes time. In some
medical situations it will exacerbate rather than alleviate the choices
that must be made. Litigation invites public comment, and public intervention, in potentially traumatic situations in which the better choice
may well be autonomous, private decision-making. Courts therefore
fervently hope they will not be asked to decide-that as a society we
will soon know enough, and achieve enough of a consensus, to resolve
these matters without litigation. Until then, however, the responsibility
will remain with the courts to resolve these profoundly uncertain questions in a manner that is consistent with the wisdom of science, the
demands of morality, and the principles of a just and caring society.
I do not mean to leave you with the impression that uncertainty is
invariably a burden. On the contrary, uncertainty creates a window of
opportunity for the continual renewal and development of the law. No
one has put this thought more eloquently than the late Professor Grant
Gilmore, my distinguished former colleague at the Yale Law School,
when he said, on the occasion of graduation ceremonies at this law
school in 1982: "If it were possible for judges and legislators to achieve
absolute clarity in their opinions and statutes, the process of adjusting
our rules to reflect changing circumstances would be even more difficult
than it now is." 16
Let me close with another quotation from Grant Gilmore to illustrate why uncertainty in the law is here to stay: "What makes law, its
study and practice, qualitatively unlike most other things that human
beings do is that we can never be sure of anything." 1 I would add only
one caveat: There is one thing of which you can be sure. In choosing a
life in the law, you are entering a profession of infinite variety and
endless fascination. Welcome!
15. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
16. Address by Professor Grant Gilmore, University of Connecticut School of Law Commencement (May 22, 1982), reprinted in 15 CONN. L. REv. 1, 2 (1982).
17. Id. at 3.

